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ESTATE AND GIFT TAX SURVEY1
often employed in other tax contexts as grounds for allowing the
Davises' reformation of the transaction. A prerequisite for a valid
reformation was that the alteration occur during the same taxable
year.
00
What is noteworthy about the Davis ruling is the court's underly-
ing acceptance, virtually as a starting point in its analysis, of a
donor's ability to make a net gift.The decision, perhaps, is another
indication that the Sixth Circuit's conclusions in Johnson will not be
followed.
VIII. TAX PROCEDURE
A. Timely Filings of Returns and Alternate Valuation Election
The procedural and administrative provisions of the Code estab-
lish various requirements for the proper and timely filing of income,
estate, and gift tax returns. A frequently recurring source of litigation
is the tardy filing of a decedent's estate tax return by the executor.'
The executor is normally required to file the estate's return within
that a surviving husband, who, as executor of his wife's estate, had mistakenly paid
too many proceeds of the estate to himself, but, who had discovered the error and
adjusted his books to correct the mistake in the same taxable year, was not liable for
any additional annual income. The court explained the "claim of right" rule as follows:
The usual case for application, of the rule involves a taxpayer who has
received funds during a taxable year, who maintains his claim of right
thereto during that year... is compelled to restore the sum when his
claim proves invalid. We are not aware that the rule has ever been
applied where, as here, in the same year that the funds are mistakenly
received, the taxpayer discovers and admits the mistake, renounces
his claim to the funds, and recognizes his obligation to pay them
.... We think there is no warrant for extending the harsh claim of
right doctrine to such a situation.
Id. at 304.
' The court in United States v. Merrill, 211 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1954), provided
the rationale for requiring the taxpayer to make the necessary alteration during the
same taxable year:
Th[e] ["claim of right"] rule is founded upon the proposition that,
when funds are received by a taxpayer under claim of right, he must
be held taxable thereon, for the Treasury cannot be compelled to
determine whether the claim is without legal warrant, and repayment
of the funds in a later year cannot, consistently with the annual ac-
counting concept, justify a refund of the taxes paid.
Id. at 304.
1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6018 requires the filing of an estate tax return.
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nine months after the date of the decedent's death.
2
The failure to file a proper and timely return may result in two
distinct but closely related consequences. First, an estate guilty of
such an omission is potentially liable for an "addition to the tax"
under § 6651.1 Second, the opportunity to use the alternate valuation
date4 will be squandered since the election must be exercised in a
timely return.' However, circumstances exist under which a tardy
executor will nevertheless be allowed to have his estate tax return
treated as timely, thereby possibly enabling him to retain the use of
the optional valuation date and to avoid the imposition of augmented
taxes. The nature and extent of these circumstances were explored
in several 1974 tax decisions.'
In Estate of Dorothy P. Crute,7 the decedent died on July 25, 1969.
Under the terms of her will, William Osborn, a bank president who
was a resident of Indiana and was experienced in handling probate
estates, was appointed executor of the estate. After the admission of
the will to probate in an Indiana court, the executor retained an
accounting firm which had previously assisted him in the administra-
tion of estates. Subsequently, a question arose as to whether Mrs.
Crute was domiciled in Indiana or Connecticut at the date of her
death. Aware of the uncertainty created by the domiciliary contro-
versy, the accounting firm advised the executor to delay any filing of
an estate tax return until the ancillary proceedings in Connecticut
2 Prior to 1970, representatives of estates were allowed 15 months for the filing of
estate tax returns and for the payment of the tax. In that year, however, Congress
reduced the time limits to nine months in an effort to accelerate the administrative
process. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6075. Revised § 6075 is applicable to estates of
decedents dying after December 31, 1970.
One related 1974 revenue ruling should be noted. In Rev. Rul. 74-424, 1974 INT.
REV. BULL. No. 35, at 10, the Commissioner ruled that the time and date of death of a
non-resident American citizen who died in the foreign country is the time and date in
the place of his domicile at the moment of death.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6651.
' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2032 provides that by election in a timely return the
executor may value the decedent's estate as of the date six months after the date of
death. Section 2032 is a modification of its predecessor, which required an election
within one year of decedent's death. Revised § 2032 is applicable to decedents dying
after December 31, 1970.
' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2032. The optional election is also operative if exercised
by the executor before the expiration of any extension of time for filing. See C.
LOWNDES, R. KRAMER, & J. McCoRD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXES 494-97 (3d ed.
1974).
1 For 1974 developments concerning timely filings of returns and elections in
addition to those in the textual discussion, see notes 23 & 35 infra.
1 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1073 (1974).
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were resolved. This counsel was tendered on the basis that Osborn
presently had no standing to file a return as an executor or to request
a time extension. Consequently, on March 10, 1971, Osborn received
notice that the return was delinquent. He then filed a return which
was received by the Internal Revenue Service on March 22, 1971. The
government thereupon informed the executor of a deficiency as well
as an addition to the tax.
8
In order for a taxpayer to avoid any such addition, he must dem-
onstrate that the delay in filing was "due to reasonable cause and not
due to willful neglect."' The standard for reasonable cause has typi-
cally been articulated as requiring the taxpayer to prove "the exercise
of ordinary business care and prudence."'" In Crute, the Tax Court
ruled that the executor had met this burden. It noted that Osborn
had been confronted with a complex legal question and had conse-
quently relied on the advice of an accounting firm expert in the estate
tax field. The court concluded that the executor's actions were com-
mensurate with ordinary business care.
A second 1974 decision, Estate of Norma S. Bradley," reached
conclusions similar to those expressed in Crute. Decedent Norma
Bradley's estate tax return was due on April 30, 1970.12 The co-
executor, Joseph Arnold, was an attorney with no prior experience in
administration of estates. He retained a local accounting firm, pre-
viously employed by him in the preparation of his personal tax re-
turns, to complete Bradley's estate tax return. An accountant in the
firm, confusing Arnold's filing obligation for the federal estate tax
with the deadline for filing a Kentucky state inheritance tax, told
See note 3 supra.
'Id.
" Southeastern Finance Co. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1946); Treas.
Reg. § 301.6651-1(a)(3) (1967), as amended T.D., 7260, 38 F.R. 4259 (Feb. 12, 1973).
Cases in which reasonable cause was not demonstrated include: Paula Construc-
tion Co., 58 T.C. 1055 (1972); Electric & Neon, Inc., 56 T.C. 1324 (1971), aff'd, 496
F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1974); Estate of Henry P. Lammerts, 54 T.C. 420 (1970); Estate of
Frank Duttenhofer, 49 T.C. 200 (1967), aff'd, 410 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1969); Estate of
William T. Mayer, 43 T.C. 403 (1964); Estate of Louis Lewis, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1732 (1963); Estate of Minnie S. Pridmore, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 47 (1961).
For cases concluding that reasonable cause was proven, see In re Fisk's Estate,
203 F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1953); Haywood Lumber & Min. Co., 178 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1950);
Estate of Daisy F. Christ, 54 T.C. 493 (1970); Estate of H. B. Hundley, 52 T.C. 495
(1969); R.A. Bryan, 32 T.C. 104 (1959); Brooklyn & Richmond Ferry Co., 9 T.C. 865
(1947); Safety Tube Corp., 8 T.C. 757 (1947); C.R. Lindback Foundation, 4 T.C. 652
(1945).
" 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 70 (1974).
" Prior to December 31, 1970, estate tax returns were due within 15 months of the
date of the decedent's death. See note 2 supra.
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Arnold that the return was due within eighteen months of Bradley's
death. After the firm's preparation of the federal estate tax return,
the executor mailed it to the IRS on May 28, 1971. The Commissioner
determined a deficiency and an addition to the tax.
The Tax Court, however, concluded that there was reasonable
cause for the late return. The government's contention that Arnold
as an attorney should be charged with knowledge of the due date of
the return so as to obviate any reliance on an accountant's advice was
rejected. Rather, the court determined that in view of the executor's
inexperience in the field of estate taxes and his previous use of the
firm for the preparation of his own taxes, he could not reasonably be
held to know the deadline for the filing of the return. Thus, consistent
with ordinary business prudence, he could rely on the firm's advice
as to when the return was due.
The government conceded that an executor may rely on incorrect
advice but contended that since Arnold knew that a return was re-
quired, he could not rely on erroneous information as to the time for
the return. The court rejected the government's proposed distinction
and ruled that such reliance was allowable:
To sustain respondent's argument would require a holding that
an executor may rely upon the advice of an expert on substan-
tive tax law questions but, as a matter of law, may not do so
with respect to the requirements of the law as to the due date
of tax returns-that he must research that question for him-
self. We decline to so hold. We fail to see a significant distinc-
tion between the reasonableness of a failure to file at all and
the reasonableness of a failure to file on time, where in both
circumstances the taxpayer has relied on the advice of compe-
tent counsel.13
Thus, the court determined that Arnold could be excused for the
delay in filing even though he was aware of the necessity of a return.
The Crute and Bradley decisions, however, are not likely to have
a substantial impact upon any judicial delineation of the guidelines
to be utilized in determining whether a taxpayer has demonstrated
reasonable cause. As those decisions indicated, each case must be
considered on its own facts and "[o]ther decisions pro and contra are
of little help.""4 However, even allowing for the factual distinctiveness
of each case, such decisions seem to have little precedential value
' 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 73.
* Mayer's Estate v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 935 (1966).
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primarily because of the failure of courts to apply uniformly the rea-
sonable cause standard. The main decisional inconsistency centers
around the extent to which executors, generally ignorant of tax laws,
may delegate their responsibility for the administration of estates to
more knowledgeable attorneys or accountants. Unlike the Bradley
court, many judges have suggested that a significant element in an
analysis of the reasonable cause requirement is whether the execu-
tor's misreliance concerned the necessity of filing a return at all or
merely the due date for the return.'5 One court was quite stringent in
its requisites for demonstrating reasonable cause in the context of an
executor's cognizance of the necessity for a return:
The only question here involved was "when" the return was
due, and not "whether" one was due. It is our opinion that
where a taxpayer should know a tax return is required. . . but
delegates the responsibility of preparing and filing the return
to a third person, the delegate's subsequent failure in this ap-
pointed task does not alone constitute reasonable cause
16
At the other extreme, the Second Circuit in Haywood Lumber &
Mining Co. v. Commissioner7 applied the standard in an extraordi-
narily lenient manner. In that case the court ruled that a corporate
taxpayer was not liable for deficiencies and additions though it had
not filed personal holding company returns:
When a corporate taxpayer selects a competent tax expert,
supplies him with all necessary information, and requests him
to prepare proper tax returns, we think that the taxpayer has
,5 See, e.g., Paula Construction Co., 58 T.C. 1055 (1972); Estate of Daisy F. Christ,
54 T.C. 493 (1970); Estate of H.B. Hundley, 52 T.C. 495 (1969); Estate of Frank
Duttenhofer, 49 T.C. 200 (1967), aff'd, 410 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1969); Estate of Louis
Lewis, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1732 (1963); Cf. Robert L. Reed, Ex'r v. United States,
64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 12, 265, at 94,431 (W.D.N.Y. 1964) (reasonable cause found where
deadline for filing was known but was missed because of "mere accident" in executor's
law office).
,6 Estate of Frank Duttenhofer, 49 T.C. 200, 205 (1967), aff'd, 410 F.2d 302 (6th
Cir. 1969). See also Estate of Henry P. Lammerts, 54 T.C. 420 (1970) (failure to make
timely fiduciary income tax return when inexperienced executor thought he had ful-
filled his duties held not reasonable cause; executor "had a positive duty to ascertain
the nature of his responsibilities as such"); Estate of Louis Lewis, 22 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1732 (1963) (held: no reasonable cause where executor knew of accountant's ill
health and had been advised that delay would likely ensue; this was sufficient to put
executor on notice that steps would be necessary to ensure timeliness of return).
7 178 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1950).
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done all that ordinary business care and prudence can reason-
ably demand....
The respondent contends that where all responsibility for
the preparation of tax returns is delegated to an agent, the
taxpayer should be held to accept its agent's efforts cum onere
and be chargeable with his negligence. . . .To impute to the
taxpayer the mistakes of his consultant would be to penalize
him for consulting an expert; for if he must take the benefit of
his counsel's or accountant's advice cum onere, then he must
be held to a standard of care which is not his own and one
which, in most cases, would be far higher than that exacted of
a layman. 8
The Second Circuit's position does not seem to be a sufficiently de-
manding standard, because the duty "of vigilance and promptness is
not a delegable one, so far as an executor is concerned. It is
personal."'9 Under the rule propounded by the Second Circuit, it is
difficult to perceive many situations not involving fraud or collusion
whereby reasonable cause would not be found. In fact, most courts
appear to adopt an interpretation of reasonable cause positioned
somewhere between the two extremes. Factors that may be determi-
native of the result include: the executor's educational and legal
background;"0 the complexity of thc legal question concerning the
filing of the return;2' and, the extent to which the delegated agent
assumes the everyday administration of the estate.2 2 However, until
the courts and the IRS prescribe more concrete and consistent guide-
lines, the confusion as to what constitutes reasonable cause for failure
to make a timely return is likely to continue unabated.?
" Id. at 771.
19 Ferrando v. United States, 245 F.2d 582, 586 (9th Cir. 1957) (emphasis in origi-
nal).
. See, e.g., Estate of Henry P. Lammerts, 54 T.C. 420, 446 (1970); Estate of
William T. Mayer, 43 T.C. 403, 406 (1964).
21 See, e.g., Paula Construction Co., 58 T.C. 1055, 1061 (1972).
22 See, e.g., Estate of William T. Mayer, 43 T.C. 403, 406 (1964).
2 In sharp contrast to the flexible utilization of the reasonable cause standard in
the Crute and Bradley decisions, the Sixth Circuit in a 1974 per curiam opinion af-
firmed a remarkably harsh Tax Court decision. In Estate of Geraci v. Commissioner,
502 F.2d 1148 (6th Cir. 1974), afl'g 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 424 (1973), petition for cert.
filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3468 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1975) (No. 853), the decedent's federal tax return
was filed on August 28, 1968, with the due date being June 27, 1968. The executrix
offered three reasons as grounds for reasonable cause: .1) the executrix, a housewife
with virtually no business experience, placed her entire reliance on the attorney for the
estate to file the return; 2) during June and July of 1968 the attorney was unable to
work because of illness; and 3) the attorney mistakenly thought that the return was
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When an estate tax return is not timely filed, a second issue as to
whether the optional valuation date can be exercised is also likely to
be litigated.24 For example, in the Bradley case when the executor
filed the estate's return, due to his unawareness of the passage of the
deadline, he elected the later valuation date. The issue was thus
presented whether an election could be made on an untimely return
if the failure to file the return on time was due to reasonable cause.
The Tax Court held the election was not effective even upon a show-
ing of reasonable cause. The court reasoned that § 2032, in contrast
to § 6651, provided for no exceptions to the rule that the deadline be
met. The regulations were also absolute in their language: "In no case
may the election be exercised, or a previous election changed, after
the expiration of [the nine month time limit] .,,2
Because of this seeming absolutism in § 2032, the provision has
been applied with great stringency.26 This position with regard to §
2032 is difficult to explain in light of the similar purposes that under-
lie the statutory requirements regarding the filing of returns and
elections. The deadlines for filings of returns and elections were both
shortened in 1970 in an effort to accelerate the payment of estate
taxes." It seems illogical to permit exceptions to this legislative man-
date for filings, while not similarly applying § 2032 with flexibility.
However, courts have concluded that any remedy for alleviating such
inconsistencies must be prescribed by legislatures rather than by the
judiciary.28 Therefore, the Bradley court determined that the govern-
due fifteen months from the date of the appointment of the executrix rather than from
the date of decedent's death. Despite all of these factors, the Tax Court found no
reasonable cause that would excuse the delay. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision
"unenthusiastically" since it could not adjudge the decision of the Tax Court to be
clearly erroneous. While admittedly the scope of review for the Sixth Circuit was
limited, it is difficult to perceive why reasonable cause was not found present in Geraci
while it was so found in Bradley.
24 See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
2 Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-1(b)(2) (1958), as amended, T.D. 7238, 37 F.R. 28718
(Dec. 29, 1972).
2, See, e.g., Rosenfield v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd
per curiam, 254 F.2d 940 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 833 (1958) (first election,
made on basis of attorney's error, could not be revoked in favor of second after due
date for return); Estate of Henry S. Downe, 2 T.C. 967 (1943) (election ineffective when
return was mailed on due date but not received by Commissioner until next day);
Estate of Frederick L. Flinchbaugh, 1 T.C. 653 (1943) (election ineffective because of
executor's failure to verify return).
" See notes 2 & 4 supra; C. LoWNDES, R. KRAMER, & J. McCoRD, FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GiFr TAXEs 623 (3d ed. 1974).
As the Supreme Court stated in J. E. Riley Investment Co. v. Commissioner,
311 U.S. 55 (1940);
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ment was correct in valuing the decedent's gross estate as of the date
of her death.
However, another 1974 decision, Estate of Johanna Ryan,2 9 indi-
cates that this hardline approach of the Bradley court may not be
completely accepted by the courts. Johanna Ryan died on March 15,
1967. In response to an inquiry from the executor, William O'Donnell,
the IRS indicated its initial opposition to a charitable deduction
established by Ryan's will. On May 24, 1968, the executor was ad-
vised that the government would retract its opposition if the life
income beneficiaries and trustee would file disclaimers of all rights
relating to the exercise of any power to divert trust principal received.
from wasting assets to income, and second, that such disclaimers be
approved by a court decree. The executor agreed to meet these de-
mands. On May 27, 1968, O'Donnell requested a six-month exten-
sion" for the filing, which was granted on June 5 of that year. Six days
later the requested disclaimers were filed3' with a New York court and
proceedings were initiated for a determination of the disclaimers'
validity and of the will's wasting assets provision. During the interim,
the executor requested another extension on November 15, 1968. This
request was rejected on December 9 with the admonition that
O'Donnell file quickly in order to meet the deadline of December 15.
On April 9, 1969, the court approved the disclaimers. Subsequently,
It seems clear that Congress provided that the election must be made
once and for all in the first return in order to avoid any such shifts.
And to require the administrative branch to extend the time for filing
on a showing of cause for delay would be to vest in it discretion which
the Congress did not see fit to delegate.
Petitioner urges that this result will produce a hardship here
.... That may be the basis for an appeal to Congress in amelioration
of the strictness of that section. But it is no ground for relief by the
courts from the rigors of the statutory choice which Congress has
provided.
Id. at 59. See also Elizabeth Lewis Saigh, 36 T.C. 395 (1961); Estate of Frederick L.
Flinchbaugh, 1 T.C. 653 (1943). Cf. Sugar Creek Coal and Min. Co., 31 B.T.A. 344
(1934).
[1974 Transfer Binder] CCH TAX CT. REP. (62 T.C. -, No. 2) at 2496 (April
8, 1974).
30 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6081.
31 It is unclear why the executor acquiesced in both of the demands. For disclaim-
ers filed in a timely manner "by a person not under any legal disability will
[ordinarily] be considered irrevocable when filed with the probate court." Treas. Reg.
20.2055-2(c)(2) (1972), as amended, T.D. 7318, 39 F.R. 25452 (July 11, 1974). As the
court pointed out, if this had been followed by a timelyreturn, the likely result would
have been the withdrawal of the IRS's opposition to the charitable deduction. [1974
Transfer Binder] CCH TAX CT. REP. (62 T.C. - , No. 2) at 2498 (April 18, 1974).
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on June 16, the Commissioner withdrew his opposition to the chari-
table deduction. On July 23 of that year O'Donnell filed Ryan's estate
tax return and indicated thereon his election of the alternate valua-
tion date.
The Tax Court held that the government was justified in denying
the election and thus determining a deficiency. However, in so hold-
ing the court chose not to rely on the strict language of § 2032, but
rather to base its denial of the election on the fact that it found no
reasonable cause which would excuse the delay." O'Donnell, after the
filing of the disclaimers, should have subsequently made a timely
return and then, after favorable action by the court, obtained judicial
modification of the determined tax with supplemental information.1
The court could not countenance the petitioner to "unilaterally im-
pose . . . a condition on the filing of the return: that [the IRS] first
consent to the withdrawal of his letter ruling." Therefore, in the
absence of a demonstration of reasonable cause, the executor forfeited
the opportunity to choose the alternate valuation date. The Ryan
court added that the effect of a finding of reasonable cause need not
be examined. This dictum appeared to suggest that, despite the lan-
guage of Bradley, courts may yet be willing to allow the alternate
valuation election when reasonable cause for the late return can be
affirmatively shown. 5
B. Government Prosecutions and the Statute of Limitations
The Code provides civil penalties" for the failure of a taxpayer to
11 The court also determined that the petitioner could not claim estoppel as a basis
for obviating the interposition of the time limitation in § 2032(c) since there had been
no misleading conduct by the government. See Elizabeth Lewis Saigh, 36 T.C. 395,
425 (1961); Sugar Creek Coal & Min. Co., 31 B.T.A. 344, 346-47 (1934).
33 Treas. Reg. § 20.6081-1(c) (1958), as amended, T.D. 7238, 37 F.R. 28722 (Dec.
29, 1972) provides for the filing of supplemental information after the due date of the
return.
[1974 Transfer Binder] CCH TAX CT. REP. (62 T.C. - , No. 2) at 2499 (April
18, 1974).
31 A 1974 revenue ruling should be noted briefly. The question involved the correct
valuation date under § 2032(a)(2) for undistributed property when there was no day
in the sixth month following the decedent's death which corresponded numerically to
the date of death. The Commissioner determined in Rev. Rul. 74-260, 1974 INT. REv.
BULL. No. 22, at 11, that the correct date would be the last day of the sixth month.
The decision was analogized to a similar provision in the estate tax regulations affixing
the due date for an estate tax return as the last day of the ninth month. Treas. Reg. §
20.6075-1 (1958), as amended, T.D. 7238, 37 F.R. 28721 (Dec. 29, 1972). Thus, if the
decedent died on October 31, 1972, the correct alternate valuation date would be April
30, 1973.
"' See also note 57 infra.
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make proper tax returns and criminal penalties37 for such failures if
they are willful. Generally, the Commissioner must make an assess-
ment within three years of the time the taxes and applicable penalties
become due. 8 Section 6531, however, provides for a three-year statute
of limitations from the date of the commission of a criminal act, with
certain exceptions extending the period to six years. 39 If a timely
complaint is instituted, the statute is tolled for nine months.40 The
purpose underlying such limitations on criminal prosecutions is to
effectuate an accommodation between two countervailing considera-
tions, the right of the individual to be free from overly delayed prose-
cutions and the government's need for adequate time in which to
develop its case, which is a frequently recurring problem in tax inves-
tigations."
The most significant recent development concerned criminal
prosecutions and the statute of limitations.2 In United States v.
Smith,4 3 the court held that governmental prosecution of the defen-
dant was not barred by § 6531 despite the fact that the indictment
was returned beyond the statute of limitations. On April 13, 1973, a
complaint was served on the defendant, James Smith, charging him
3 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 7201-7216.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6501.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6531.
40 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6531 provides in pertinent part:
Where a complaint is instituted before a commissioner of the United
States within the period above limited, the time shall be extended
until the date which is 9 months after the date of the making of the
complaint before the commissioner of the United States.
"In discussing the right of the individual to a speedy trial under the Sixth
Amendment, the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966):
This guarantee is an important safeguard to prevent undue and op-
pressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern
accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that
long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.
However, in large measure because of the many procedural safeguards
provided an accused, the ordinary procedures for criminal prosecution
are designed to move at a deliberate pace. A requirement of unreason-
able speed would have a deleterious effect both upon the rights of the
accused and upon the ability of society to protect itself . . . . [T]he
applicable statute of limitations . . . is . . . considered the primary
guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal charges.
Id. at 120, 122.
12 For a 1974 development concerning civil suits and the statute of limitations, see
note 57 infra.
" Smith was decided in 1973 but not reported until the following year. 371 F.
Supp. 672 (M.D.N.C. 1973).
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with a willful attempt to evade his gift tax obligations44 as of April
15, 1967. Since no grand jury was then in session, an indictment was
returned on May 11, 1973, during the next regular session of the grand
jury. Smith argued that the six year statute of limitations" barred his
prosecution since the indictment was not issued until the period had
run. Normally, the issuance of a complaint within the proper time
limit would toll the period of limitation for an additional nine
months.46 The defendant argued, however, on the basis of Jaben v.
United States" that the tolling exception should not be triggered by
the complaint.
The Supreme Court had held in Jaben that for the tolling excep-
tion in § 6531 to be activated the complaint must be sufficient to
begin effectively the criminal process mandated by the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure."' Specifically, as the government acknowl-
edged, the complaint must indicate the essential facts constituting
the alleged offense. However, the court ruled that such adherence
to Rule 3 was insufficient alone to trigger automatically the time
extension in § 6531. As Mr. Justice Harlan stated:
Clearly the statute was not meant to grant the Government
greater time in which to make its case (a result which could
have been accomplished simply by making the normal period
of limitation six years and nine months) . . . .The Govern-
ment's interpretation . . . provides no safeguard whatever to
prevent [it] from filing a complaint at a time when it does not
have its case made, and then using the nine-month period to
make it.0
" A willful attempt to evade the payment of a tax is a criminal act under INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7201.
15 Section 6531(2) extends the statute of limitations to six years when the alleged
offense involves a willful attempt to evade the payment of the due tax. INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 6531(2).
I6 See note 40 supra.
47 381 U.S. 214 (1965). In Jaben, on the day before the expiration of the six year
limitation period for willful attempt to evade income taxes, the Internal Revenue
Service filed a complaint against the defendant for the violation of such offense. The
complainant indicated to a United States Commissioner the manner in which he had
conducted his investigation and the factors underlying his belief in the guilt of the
defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the defendant, concluding
that the complaint afforded probable cause for the belief in the guilt of the defendant.
Is In effect, Jaben required that Rules 3, 4 and 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedures be institutionalized in order for complaints and indictments to be effective.
381 U.S. at 220.
' See FED. R. CRiM. P. 3.
381 U.S. at 219-20.
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Therefore, the majority determined that a complaint must satisfy the
probable cause requirement of Rule 4 in order to toll the statute of
limitations. Also, as demanded by Rule 5, the defendant must be
given adequate notice and be brought before a Commissioner for a
preliminary hearing unless a superseding indictment had subse-
quently been returned.
The defendant in Smith contended that Jaben was authority for
the proposition that the government cannot utilize the tolling excep-
tion when it has adequate time to obtain an indictment within the
six year period. Smith argued that since a government investigation
had been initiated in 1970 and since a grand jury had been in session
on March 22, 1973, the government had unnecessarily delayed the
issuance of the complaint and thus was attempting to utilize the
tolling exception in the proscribed manner. The court in Smith, how-
ever, concluded that the concern articulated in Jaben was not applic-
able to the prosecution of Smith and that consequently the tolling
mechanism could be triggered. It viewed Jaben as permitting the
complaint method to be employed when the government had suffi-
ciently made out its case to meet the probable cause standard." The
court acknowledged that if a grand jury had been in session at the
time of the issuance of the complaint, the government might have
been required to obtain an indictment prior to the expiration of the
statute of limitations." Nevertheless, in the absence of such a sitting
grand jury, the government was not obligated to call a special session
of the grand jury.53 The concern of the Supreme Court in Jaben, that
the government might use the extension "to make its case,"54 was to
5, 371 F. Supp. at 674. This presumably would allow the government to continue
to develop its case during the nine month tolling period as long as the complaint
initially met the probable cause requirement. Since the Court in Jaben did not detail
the manner in which the prosecution could not continue its investigation, the Smith
court's conclusion was, if not mandated, at least a permissible one.
52 Id.
11 The court acknowledged that a special session could be obtained if the court so
allowed and if a judge would be available for supervision of the session. Id. at 674. A
strict reading of Jaben would seem to demand that the government make an attempt
to call such a special session. As the court stated:
[Blasically, the evident statutory purpose of the nine-month exten-
sion provision is to afford the Government an opportunity to indict
criminal tax offenders in the event that a grand jury is not in session
at the end of the normal limitation period. . . .Clearly the statute
• . .was intended to deal with the situation in which the Government
has its case made within the normal limitation period but cannot
obtain an indictment because of the grand jury schedule.
381 U.S. at 219-20 (emphasis added).
11 Id. at 219. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
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be alleviated by ascertaining whether the complaint did in fact make
a showing of probable cause. Additionally, the court reasoned that
Smith had the right to move for a preliminary hearing before such
right was superseded by the return of an indictment. Therefore, the
tolling period was triggered since its activation would endanger none
of the safeguards preserved by Jaben.
Although Jaben had a seemingly restrictive effect on the utiliza-
tion of § 6531, subsequent decisions have appeared to limit its im-
pact. 5 The refusal of the court in Smith to apply the tolling exception
of § 6531 automatically evinces a greater sensitivity to the rationale
underlying Jaben than that manifested by other courts.5 6 However,
the decision of the court not to require a special session of the grand
jury may well result in the same decisional limitation of Jaben. Hope-
fully, Smith will imperil none of the protections sought to be effec-
tuated by Jaben.57
See, e.g., United States v. Bland, 458 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
843 (1972) (return of "no-bill" by first grand jury was not equivalent of dismissal of
complaint and thus succeeding grand jury could return an indictment during the same
tolling period). Cf. United States v. Grayson, 416 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1059, rehearing denied, 397 U.S. 1003 (1970).
56 Some courts have ignored the express statement in Jaben that the tolling provi-
sion is not to be applied mechanically. For example, the court in United States v.
Bland, 458 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972) asserted:
Even the liberal policy in favor of repose [citations omitted] can not
overcome the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute. The exten-
sion provided by the Congress in the proviso to § 6531 is by its terms
absolute. A sufficient complaint having been filed during the prime
period of the statute, the government is entitled to make its presenta-
tion to the grand jury. . . until the expiration of a time nine months
from the filing of the complaint with the commissioner.
458 F.2d at 5-6. See also United States v. Grayson, 416 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1059, rehearing denied, 397 U.S. 1003 (1970); Bruce v. United States,
351 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 921 (1966).
11 Another 1974 decision, but one involving civil rather than criminal penalties,
also centered around a dispute as to whether the government's suit was barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. In United States v. Russell, 327 F. Supp 632 (1971),
rev'd, 461 F.2d 605 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1012 (1972), the government filed
suit on April 3, 1969 against Harriet Russell under § 6324(a)(2) of the Code, which
imposes liability for unpaid estate taxes on a surviving joint tenant. The district court
originally granted Russell's motion for summary judgment on the theory that since no
assessment of taxes was ever made against her as transferee, the action was barred by
§ 6901(c). This provision establishes a one-year statute of limitations for assessment
of any estate tax liability against initial transferees after the expiration of the three-
year statute of limitations under § 6501(a) against transferors. The Tenth Circuit,
however, reversed and remanded, concluding that § 6901 was not the exclusive method
for tax collection but was "cumulative and alternative" to other methods. United
States v. Russell, 461 F.2d 605, 606 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1012 (1972).
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On remand, the district court adjudged § 6502, which deals with the collection of
unpaid taxes and not with their assessment, to be the applicable statute of limitations
to actions brought under § 6324(a)(2). The court concluded that the action was timely
under § 6502 since only a total amount of four years and nine months had elapsed since
the assessment of taxes against the decedent-husband (the six-year statute of limita-
tions having started to run at the time of such assessments). Since the suit was timely
filed under § 6502, the government could utilize the general tax lien established by §
6321 to collect the owed estate taxes. 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 13,036, at 85,871 (D. Kan.
1974).
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